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ADDRESS
BY
THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE

THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONVENTION

9:00 A.M.
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 13, 1975
SHERATON-MT. ROYAL HOTEL
MONTREAL, QUEBEC, CANADA

•
At one time I had thought to use this forum for a
general presentation of the work of the Department of Justice.
For reasons, which I suppose are

obv~ous,

would not accomplish what I had in mind.

I soon realized this
The Department is

accountable in many ways and to many groups.

As Elliot

Richardson frequently pointed out, lawyers are in a minority
if one counts the total roster of the Department.

Yet it is

to the members of the bar I am most anxious to convey a sense
of how the Department is approaching its problems and how
it views the nature of some of its concerns.

Your understanding

is of the utmost importance, for we share responsibilities.
In light of this I have thought it best to make some general
comments and then to select four areas for this discussion.
Each area is entitled to a much more detailed presentation.
Yet the combination, I hope, will be of interest to you.
In preparing for this meeting, I recalled the timing
of last year's gathering in Honolulu.

The months preceding

it were marked by a frenzy of activity and an expectation
that there would soon be an historic trial in the United States.
Then, only days before Chesterfield Smith officially opened
your deliberations, the President of the United States resigned.
The powers of the executive branch of the Federal Government
passed to a new President.

This year's meeting comes at a

time when the business of law and government proceeds much
more normally.

The history of the transformation is a strong

reaffirmation of the vitality of our institutions.

The legal

profession is free of some of the tensions of 1974.

But the

institutions of law and the profession still have the legacy
of a skepticism which has grown over many years.
can be useful.

Mistrust can be corrosive.

Skepticism

Justified mistrust

places the heaviest burden upon us.
Not long ago I conferred with members of your Special
Committee to Study Law Enforcement Agencies.

I was given the

privilege then of seeing certain tentative recommendations-
part of a work in progress and subject to change--aimed at
protecting the stature of the Department of Justice and insulating
it from partisan politics.

I agree that among the functions

of the Department--and perhaps its most important, for it
summarize's all the others--is as a symbol of the administration
of justice.

There is no half-heartedness in our effort to

achieve and maintain a Department of the highest professional
competence and standards, free of partisan purpose.

I choose

to think my colleagues and I would not be at the Department
if it were otherwise.

The tentative suggestions of the Committee

which I have seen have not as yet been presented to you, and
of course I shall not discuss them either now or later in this
talk.

My guess is that the Committee, although I may be wrong,

will not find fault with my view, that both for the short and
the long effort, it is the spirit, the quality and the recogniZed("'
goal of the Department which will count the most.

The remedy

is thus simpler and more difficult than automatic solutions.

This is true not only of the Department

bu~

for our profession

as a whole.

I need not remind this gathering that the Department
of Justice does not carry sole responsibility for the fair
and effective administration of the laws of the United States.
Much of it rests upon you.

The nature of our laws; the pro

cedure and judgments of the Courts; the work of law enforce
ment officials; the wisdom, skill and zeal of the bar are all
involved.

In a larger but most important way, it is the com

bination and relationship among the executive and legislative
leadership of government--in the context of federalism; the
performance of units with specific professional responsibility
for the law; and the mood, habits and ideals of our communities
which determine the quality of justice.

This larger picture--which

is realistic--may seem to diminish the good which can be accomp
lished by any individual unit or segment.
true.

But the opposite is

The system can change and be responsive.

The recognition

of interdependence is a necessary starting point, even as we
insist, as we must, on the necessary independence which the
discharge of specific duties requires.

The Department of Justice

must be seen in this setting.
The Department of Justice is an integral part of
government.

The oath of the President is to defend the Constitu

tion, and the Constitution requires that hre take care that the
laws are faithfully executed.

Because of the nature of the rule

of law, the Department has a pervasive and particular role.

If one looks at Article One, Section Eight of the Constitution,
a lawyer, at least, will immediately recognize the point.
The Department does not negotiate issues of conflict or trade
with foreign nations, manage the national debt or coin
money_

It does not supervise the national programs for agri

culture or for the regulated industries.

It is not the adminis

trator for systems of taxation and social welfare, nor for- the
protection of the environment and the sources of energy.

But

the Department over time has been concerned in greater or lesser
degree in some way--and sometimes deeply--with all these
activities.

Indeed I am sure that one or more of my colleagues

in the Cabinet may be pleased and surprised at this statement
of partial renunciation.

The Department has to be a special

advocate, not only in defending governmental decisions at law,
but in the attempt to infuse into them the qualities and values
which are of the utmost importance to our constitutional system.
Thus there must be a special concern for fair, orderly, efficient
procedures, for the balance of constitutional rights, and for
questions of federalism and the proper regard for the separation
of powers.

It is sometimes said that, so far as the Department

is concerned, courts alone have this duty.

I do not agree.

The work of the Department inevitably frequently
involves most directly the safety and well being of the
community and the protection of individual rights.

This fact

elevates the review which the Department must make of its
performance and priorities to more than an exercise in

efficiency, although that is important.
wc~k

The Department's

is likely to be at that central point where conflicting

values meet.

One traditional way for the law to meet such

problems is to fashion a realm of ambiguity.

Particularly

where the government is involved, with its inherent coercive
power, these cloudy areas invite suspicion and mistrust.

Where

the values are in conflict, the law is ·not as clear as it should
, be, and the matter is of great importance to the safety of
our country, the burden upon the Department is heavy.
I do not suggest ambiguities can be completely avoided.
I know they cannot be.

And the case by case approach of our

law which thrives on ambiguity--to say nothing of the lack
of clarity in legislation--is part of the genius of government
and no doubt is necessary.

But a prime and useful function of

the law as it operates is to help explain the conflict in values
and often to bring to issue the problems which are involved.
This is not

alw~ys

possible; discussion may be difficult.

The

central position'and power of the Department are such that it
ought to attempt to be articulate about these conflicts in
values.

The role is one of law revision, resolution, or accept

ance of dichotomies which in a democratic society ought to be
set forth.

There are other areas where change through legisla

tion is much needed, but because emotions are high on both
sides, no proposal is easy to advance.

Again I think it is the

duty of the Department, where the administration of justice is
concerned, to encourage the discussion and to make suggestions.

I do not regard these views as surprising.

They are not always

easy to follow.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is established
by statute in the Department of Justice.

The basic jurisdiction

for the Bureau's investigative work in the detection of crime
derives from generat legislation which gives the Attorney General
the power to appoint officials "to detect and prosecute crime
against the United States."

Other statutes vest in the Bureau

specific responsibilities to investigate particular types of
violations.

The same general legislation which criminal

investigative authority also allows the Attorney General to
appoint officials "to conduct such other investigations regard
ing official matters under the control of the Department of
Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the
Attorney General."

This provision and the authority of the

President, exercised through executive orders, presidential
statements or directives, have been the foundation of certain
investigative activities of the. Bureau that do not necessarily
relate, and frequently do not relate, to criminal prosecutions.
Shortly after I took office, I appointed a committee
in the Department of Justice to study the practices of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and to develop a comprehensive
set of guidelines to govern its future conduct.

The committee

of six attorneys, including one from the Bureau

has been

meeting several times a week over the last five months.

The

mandate of the Committee is broad: to reconsider the whole
range of Bureau investigative practices

from the use of

organized crime informants to the use of warrantless
electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelligence
information.

The Committee has written detailed proposed

guidelines in four areas:

investigations requested by the

White House, investigations for Congressional and judicial
staff appointments, unsolicited mail, and investigations to
obtain domestic intelligence.

The Committee is proceeding

to draft guidelines for additional areas such as organized
crime intelligence,

crimin~l

investigations, the federal

security employee program, counter intelligence and foreign
intelligence investigations, and background investigations
for federal judicial appointments.
Each of the guidelines has special problems and
requires particular solutions.

For example, some of the

alleged instances of misuse of the FBI over previous periods
have involved directions from the White

~ouse,

often from

low ranking officials, given orally, and couched in terms
of law enforcement or national security.

They involved such

matters as surveillance at a political convention, investigation
of a newsman unsympathetic to the Administration cause, or the
collection of information on political opponents.

The proposed

guidelines require that the request be made or confirmed in
writing, specifies those who may make requests, requires the
official initiating the investigation be identified, the
purpose of the investigation stated among certain routine
areas, and where a field investigation is initiated, an
attestation that the subject has given consent.

During Congressional hearings, a great deal of
concern was voiced about the FBI's retention in its files
of unsolicited derogatory information about individuals-
including Congressmen and Senators.

The Bureau does receive

a great deal of information which is unsolicited by the Bureau
and does not bear upon matters within its jurisdiction.

It

is the repository of many complaints--some of which concern
personal habits or incidents.

As I commented at the hearings,

there are policy considerations which argue in favor of
retention of unsolicited allegations.

A vitriolic accusation

concerning a Congressman can become of substantial importance
if there is a subsequent attempt at anonymous extortion or
other threats.

There are other examples not difficult to

imagine in which the allegation, as part of a developing later
picture, becomes significant.

Moreover the destruction of

material which later might be thought to have been an alert to
all kinds of serious problems can be seriously criticized.
Nevertheless I expressed the hope that a procedure could be
devised to screen materials to be retained.

The proposed

guidelines would require that unsolicited information, not
alleging serious criminal behavior that ought to be investigated
by the FBI or reported to other law enforcement agencies, be
destroyed--within ninety days of receipt.

Other guidelines

confront directly the question of the length of time other
kinds of investigative materials should be retained.

Perhaps the most important guidelines the Department
of Justice Committee has yet drafted involves domestic
intelligence inquiries.

For decades the FBI has been conducting

investigations of groups suspect by it or other government
agencies of being involved in subversive activities.

Unlike

conventional criminal ,investigations, these investigations
have no built-in necessary, automatic conclusion.
continue as long as there is a perceived threat.
not reviewed outside the FBI.

They
They are

They come close to first

amendment rights.
The proposed guidelines would limit domestic
intelligence activities to the pursuit of information about
activities that may involve the use of force or violence in
violation of federal law in specified ways.

Full scale

investigations would be reported immediately to the Attorney
General under the proposed guidelines.

He would be required

to review them periodically and to close an investigation
any time he determined that the justification for such an
investigation does not meet certain enumerated standards.
The proposed guidelines would limit the techniques the Bureau
~

could use in domestic intelligence investigations.

Informants,

for example, could not be used to originate the idea of
committing a crime or to induce others to carry out such
ideas.

Electronic surveillance could not be used in limited

investigations and, when employed in full investigations,
would have to be consistent with Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and subject to

specified minimization procedures.
The proposed guidelines deal with the difficult


subject of the Bureau's involvement in preventive action.

l

The Bureau and the Department have made public the fact that
before 1972, and for a number of prior years, the Bureau engaged
in special programs directed at domestic 'groups; for example,
it improperly disseminated information from its files to discredit
individuals, or arranged for the sending of anonymous letters, or
the publication of material intended to create opposition.

I

have described such activities as foolish and sometimes outrageous.
They were done in the name of diminishing violence.

The proposed

guidelines accept the proposition that in limited circumstances
carefully controlled FBI activity which directly intercedes to
prevent violence is appropriate.

Traditionally officers of

the law are empowered to prevent violence when they see it
occurring.

Under the proposed guidelines the Attorney General

would have to determine that there is probable cause to believe
that violence is imminent and cannot be prevented by arrest
before he could authorize preventive action.

The preventive

action would have to be itself non-violent and could involve
only such techniques as using informants to lead people away
from violent plans; open and obvious physical surveillance to
deter people from committing acts of violence; restricting access
to the instrumentalities or planned location of the violence.
Attorney General would be required to report periodically
to Congress on any preventive action plans he authorized.

The

t~

The proposed guidelines are far more detailed than
the summary I have given.
of the exercise.

But the summary suggests the nature

Despite the argument that to an investigative

agency all information it comes across may be valuable--may
even turn out to be crucial--the guidelines balance the argument
against the interests of individuals in privacy.

Despite

arguments that domestic intelligence operations are essential
to national security and must proceed unencumbered by detailed
procedures ;of authentication. the guidelines recognize the
effect that unfettered investigations of that kind might
have on legitimate domestic political activity and propose
tight controls.
form.
orders.

The guidelines obviously are not in final

Some might be most appropriate as statutes or executive
Others could be put into effect by regulation.

Before any go into effect there will be more discussion, both
within the Department and outside of it.

They have not been

adopted, although they frequently reflect current practice.
Whatever the outcome, they do represent a necessary effort
which undoubtedly,' but for other concerns, would have been
undertaken years ago.
The Department of Justice has had for many years,
and now has, special responsibilities for warrantless electronic
surveillance.

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and

Safe Streets Act of 1968 sets up a detailed procedure for the
interception of wire or oral communications.

It requires

the issuance of a judicial warrant, prescribes the information
to be set forth in the petition to the judge so that, among

other things, he may find probable cause that a crime has
been or is about to be·committed.

It requires notification

to the parties subject to the surveillance within a period
after it has taken place.

So far as the federal government

is concerned, the statute provides that the application to
the Federal judge must be authorized by the Attorney General
or an Assistant Attorney General especially designated by
him.

This is hardly the procedure one would design for the

continuing detection of the activities of foreign powers
or their agents.

The Act, however, contains a saving clause

to the effect that it does not limit the constitutional power
of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary
to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or
other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign
intelligence information deemed essential to the security of
the United States, or to protect national security information
against foreign intelligence activities.

Apparently on the

assumption that the President would use such a power, the Act
then goes on to specify the conditions under which information
obtained through presidentially authorized interceptions
may be received into evidence.

In speaking of this saving

clause, Mr. Justice Powell in the Keith case wrote: "Congress
simply left presidential powers where it found them."
At least since 1940, and possibly before, Attorneys

t;

General under Presidential directives, have authorized warrantless;
electronic surveillance.

As is well known, President Franklin

Roosevelt issued such a directive to Robert Jackson in May 1940.

The directive spoke of persons suspected of subversive
activities against the United States.

President Truman

concurred in a modified authorization to Attorney General
Tom C. Clark in 1946 put in terms of cases vitally affecting
the domestic security or where human life is in jeopardy.
President Johnson issued such a memorandum in June 1965 to
Attorney General Katzenbach,

The memorandum expressed

President Johnson's strong opposition to the interception
of telephone conversations as a general investigative
technique but recognized that mechanical and electrical
devices might have to be used ,for this purpose in protecting
national security.

Under all these directives, the approval

of the Attorney General was required for any action taken.
There is a history concerning the necessary approval
of'the Attorney General.

Director Hoover over the years took

a strict view of the use of wiretapping.

He thought such

surveillance should be used only in cases of an extraordinary
nature.

He once wrote that the approval of the Attorney

General was a necessary safeguard to prevent "promiscuous
wiretapping."

He also wrote that under the system which he

set up in 1940, he was the only head of a Government
investigating agency "who does not have the authority to
authorize a wiretap."

He wrote that he felt "quite strongly"

that "no Government agency should tap a phone unless it is
specifically approved in each instance by the Attorney General.;"

He frequently made the point that the main purpose of such
surveillance was for tne "procurance of intelligence
information" in highly sensitive areas, and he thought it
was better to have one official give the authorization
or deny it.
I need hardly remind you that since 1928 the law
in this area, not unlike others, has changed.

In Olmstead

in 1928 it was concluded that wiretapping did not violate the
Fourth or Fifth Amendments.

This caused a flurry in the

Department because it raised a question concerning the
inconsistent attitude within the Department between the Bureau
of Prohibition and the Bureau of Investigation.
of the Bureau of Prohibition were much more lax.

The practices
Olmstead

was followed by the passage of Section 605 of the -Federal
Communications Act, and by the subsequent 1937 ruling of the
Supreme Court in Nardone that evidence so obtained was not
admissible in criminal prosecutions in a federal court.
Attorney General Biddle in 1941, summarizing what he had said
at a press conference, wrote to Director Hoover that the
Attorney General would continue to construe the Communications
Act not to prohibit the interception of communications by an
agent and his reporting of their contents to his superior
office.

He said that while this could be said of all crimes,

as a matter of policy wiretapping would be used sparingly and
under express authorization of the Attorney General.

The shape of the present law today is set by Title
III and its saving clause; by the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the Keith case in 1972, and by subsequent
decisions in three of the United States Courts of Appeals.
In the Keith case, the Court held that in the field of internal
security, if there was no foreign involvement, a judicial
warrant was required by the Fourth Amendment.

The Department

in its subsequent practice has, of course, conformed to that
decision.

Justice Pow:ell spe:tking for the Court emphasized

"this case involves only the domestic aspects of national
security.

We have not addressed and have expressed no opinion

as to the issues which may be involved with respect to activities
of foreign powers or their "agents."

This was followed by a

footnote giving a reference which buttresses the view that
warrantless surveillance may be constitutional where foreign
powers are involved.

Along with two cases, the American Bar

Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice is cited.
Since Keith, two federal courts of appeals--the Third Circuit
and the Fifth--have upheld warrantless surveillances for pur
poses of foreign intelligence.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit on June 23rd last held that a
warrant was required for surveillance of the Jewish Defense
League.

That organization was not an agent or collaborator

with a foreign power even though it was involved in violent
harrassment of officials of a foreign government, and this
might have had foreign consequences.

The holding of the

Court was carefully limited.

The far ranging views

expressed by Judge Skelly Wright in the plurality opinion,
however, apparently would require some kind of a judicial

(

warrant for any kind of non-consensual electronic surveillance.
But Judge Wright was ca+"eful to repeat, H we hold t'oday only
that a warrant must be obtained before a wiretap is installed
on a domestic organization that is neither the agent of nor
acting in collaboration with a foreign power, even if the
surveillance is installed under presidential directive in
the name of foreign intelligence gathering for protection
of the national security."

This holding is not inconsistent

with what was decided in the Fifth Circuit in Brown in 1973,
and in the Third Circuit in Butenko in 1974.
While it may not be relevant-although I think it isI think it can be said that the Supreme Court surely realized, in
view of the importance the Government has placed on the need for
warrantless electronic' surveillance, that after the holding in
the Keith case, the Government would proceed with the procedures
it had developed to conduct such surveillances not prohibited;
that is, in the foreign intelligence area, or, as Justice
Powell said, "with respect to activities of foreign powers
or their agents."

I think the same observation can be made

about the expectations in this regard which Congress must
have had after the 1968 act.

It could hardly have been a

surprise when, three months after the Keith case, Attorney'''':
General Richardson indicated the continuation of such surveillances
and placed the conditions for them in -the foreign intelligence

field in terms of the "contours of the President's power
as suggested by Congress in the 1968 law."
Justice Powell in the Keith case did not apply the
1968 statute.

He emphasized, indeed, that the Court did not

hold that the same kind of standards and procedures prescribed
by the statute would necessarily be applicable in that kind
of domestic security case.

I believe that was an invitation

to the Congress to design something different.

If I read

Judge Wright correctly in the expression of his wider ranging
views, his belief is that courts on their own may devise
new kinds of warrants, although the relationship to Title III
would then seem unclear.

Meanwhile the Department has

continued its efforts to perfect the standards and processes
used, under the authorization of the President, when the
Attorney General gives or denies his consent to a proposed
electronic .survei11ance.

Last June the Department reported the

number of such telephone and microphone surveillances for the
year 1974.

The number of subjects of telephone surveillances

was 148; the number of microphone surveillances was 32.

On

July 9, commenting on the Department's practice, I publicly
stated "there are no outstanding instances of warrantless taps
or electronic surveillance directed against American citizens
and none will be authorized by me except in cases where the
target of the surveillance is an agent or collaborator of
a foreign power." We have very much in mind the necessity to
determine what procedures through legislation, court action or

executive processes will best serve the national interest,

{

including, of course, the protection of constitutional
rights.
The concern about FBI conduct and warrantless
electronic surveillance are examples of the Department of
Justice looking inward in its effort to confront important
issues of civil liberty.

The Civil Rights Division of the

Department exemplifies the outward reach of this concern.
In the late 1950s and 1960s it faced a situation in which
many state and local governments enforced laws that blatantly
discriminated.

Discriminatory treatment in employment and

public accommodations was the rule in large areas of the nation.
Changing this situation was a long, difficult and painful
endeavor.

Even in 1968, sixty-eight percent of all black

students in eleven Southern states went to all-black schools.
The "dual school system" was still in effect.

By 1972 that

figure had declined to a little more than nine percent.
Today the Civil Rights Division's effort against
race discrimination is a more subtle one.

Often it is difficult

now to show a history of de jure segregation, and more importantly,
as the quest for equal opportunity becomes more successful,
some of the demands of minority groups might, if met, involve
unfair deprivations of others.

A difficult balance is required.
},

private civil rights suits is being filed which makes it even
more important that basic legal concepts be clarified.

'
"

It is made more pressing today because a great number of

This

clarification is impeded in many respects by semantic breakdown.

Words that could express the conundrums and conflicting
values are taken to indicate a broad opposition to civil
ri~hts.

Euphemisms have been substituted for logic.

Thus

the metaphysics of the distinctions between quotas, which
are taken to be bad. and goals, which are taken to be good.
Now whatever these gevices which seek a sort of numerical
parity among racial and ethnic groups might be called,
I think it could be agreed they are appropriate when a
'specific showing is made abo1lt a specific institution that it
has discriminated against minority groups in the past, and
this form of relief is necessary.
action programs goes much further.

But the reach of affirmative
Affirmative action would

choose a parity figure and then impose it without regard to
a specific showing of discrimination.
The Civil Rights Division has, of course, not
solved the riddle of so-called "reverse discrimination."
Neither has the Supreme Court.

It had the opportunity in

the DeFunis case, but it withheld judgment.
wise.

Perhaps that was

Perhaps it is not a moment ripe for the elucidation

of a principle.

Temporarily--and I hope briefly--we may be

standing at a moment at which the internal conflict in our
ideal of equality is seeking an equilibrium which is not yet
obvious--nor even, perhaps, attainable--to us.

But the problem

is not insoluble, even though we might not immediately see
how the resolution of competing interests can be accomplished.
It is the duty of the legal profession--one we should welcome-
to seek accommodations in difficult situations in such a way as
to protect fundamental values.

Though its major work is still in the area of
minority rights, the Civil Rights Division lately has begun
to assert the rights of other disadvantaged groups within
society.

Beginning more than two years ago with an important

test case that involved the issue of a constitutional right
to treatment for the institutionalized mentally ill, its work
has extended into other sorts of institutions whose purpose
require some limitation on individual liberty and whose
residents are not in a position to assert their rights unaided.
The aim is to ensure that every effort is made to minimize those
limitations so that even the powerless and the infirm might enjoy
some measure of freedom and obtain decent, 'civilized treatment.
The Division has become involved in cases asserting a right of
juvenile offenders to be treated during their incarceration,
cases attacking negligent conduct by states in placing children
who have become their wards, and cases seeking to require state
officials to bring nursing homes for the aged up to minimum
health and safety standards.
It is well to recall in all these efforts on behalf
of the disadvantaged among us, however, that our most benign
efforts sometimes yield hurtful results.

When society turned

its gentle eye upon the young some decades ago, it produced
the juvenile justice system which today is in many places a
shambles.

Likewise, the corrections reform movement of

about a century ago insisted upon the humane ideal of
rehabilitation, and that concept has led to indeterminate
sentences. dubious efforts at behavior modification, and

despair so deep that the whole idea of helping those who
are convicted of crime has been called into question.
is

llOt

This

to cast doubt upon the importance of the Civil Rights

Divis_on's efforts, of course, because they are aimed at
righting some of the wrongs earlier reforms produced.

But

it is to suggest that as lawyers we must know the limits of
the law and the fact that other social institutions are
sometimes able to do that which law cannot do.
I come now to the fourth area I wanted to discuss with
you--the problem of crime.

For some years the federal government

acted as if its abilities in bringing crime under control were
limitless.

It created expectations in the public that could

not be met.

Public disappointment provoked, not a re-examination

of the basic assumptions of the federal government's efficacy,
but rather an increasing emphasis on toughness, even vindictiveness
against those convicted of crime.

This obscured a feature of

the crime problem that is important now to reconsider.

Every

success in reducing crime--especially street crime people fear
most--is a victory for individual liberty so long as the
success does not come at the expense of constitutional rights
guaranteed criminal defendants.

The sense of vindictiveness

that intruded upon the discourse about crime led to the
misapprehen$ion that prosecuting criminals somehow infringes
upon rights rather than protect them .
Serious crime rose 18

~ercent

during the first three

months of 1975 compared with the same period last year.

In

1974 serious crime was up 17 percent, according to the FBI's

Uniform Crime Statistics.

Increases in the rate of

violent street crime have paralleled the total increase.
These sad figures do not begin to measure the effect on
individual freedom increasing crime has had.

It has affected

not only the immediate victims of violence and theft; it has
also embedded fear in the minds of countless Americans.
Freedom of movement, freedom of association, even the freedom
to rest secure in one's own house have been impaired.
Law enforcement is a central part of the protection of
human ri.ghts.

The sentiments that lead officials to believe

it is better to minimize law enforcement in poor and minority
group neighborhoods of our cities are at best misguided.

A

study by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of
crime in five large cities showed that blacks were nearly twice
as likely as whites to be the victims of robbery or burglary.
In four of those cities blacks were also more likely than
whites to be the victim of violent agravated assault.

Lack

of adequate law enforcement, more so even than lack of other
government services, deprives the poor of their right to live
a decent life.
The President has recently delivered a message on
crime which, while it admitted the limitations of the federal
government's ability to solve the problem of crime, offered'
some reforms in the federal criminal justice system which might,
serve as models for states to follow.

It set forth a program (

of gun control that offers the possibility of stemming some
of the violence that besets our cities.

It emphasized the

plight of the victims of crimes and thus began a process by
which the problem of crime can be rescued from the rhetoric
tllat has trapped

i~ for years. The Department of Justice,

in addition to working to implement the President's program,
is attempting to develop a strong research and policy study
capability that can help us direct efforts against crime
more effectively.

This is being done through a revitalized

National Institute of Justice.
I have chosen these four areas for discussion
because I believe they give

some flavor of how the Department

of Justice is approaching problems important to it and to
the thrust of law in our society.

I have chosen them as

examples not only because they are important in themselves
but also because they indicate ongoing work by the Department
in areas involving the conflict of important social values.
Our hope is that we can meet problems with candor and some
depth of understanding, informed by the history of our discipline,
conscious of the ideals to be maintained, vigilant for the
welfare of our society and the protection of human rights; in
short, in a way which fits the best traditions of our profession.
I thank you for inviting me to speak at this
meeting which as much as any event in the law reminds us of
who we are and of the purposes we serve .

